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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Imagine a reality where the justice system operates like 
a stock exchange. Envision that system as permitting investors 
to buy percentages of a plaintiff’s harm as an investment 
opportunity. Further, contemplate that system as employing 
algorithmic tools to determine the likelihood of a lawsuit’s 
success for financing purposes. Now look around. On August 
22, 2016, Eva Shang, a Harvard attendee turned entrepreneur, 
unveiled her startup—Legalist—for a crowd of potential 
investors in Mountain View, California.1 Legalist is a litigation 
                                                     
a1 J.D. Candidate, 2017, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.A., 
2013, Morehead State University. In recognition of Timothy Alan, 
Donna Sue, and Whitney Rachelle Bragg for their endless support 
and guidance. 
1 Joshua Hunt, What Litigation Finance is Really About, THE NEW 
YORKER, (Sept. 1, 2016), 
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finance company that uses a technologically-driven method to 
select, vet, and invest in litigation.2 Legalist, unlike its 
competitors,3 uses an electronic algorithm “to calculate the 
likelihood that a lawsuit will succeed, the company then invests 
in cases it deems promising. If a plaintiff it has funded prevails, 
Legalist takes a percentage of the winnings—usually between 
twenty-five and thirty  percent [sic].”4  
The reality is that our judiciary has shifted. Legalist, and 
litigation finance start-ups like it, are the most recent in a 
twenty-year-string of advances made in third-party litigation 
finance (“TPLF” or “litigation lending”). The age-old doctrines 
of maintenance and champerty5 are all but forgotten,6 and an 
                                                     
http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/what-litigation-
finance-is-really-about.  
2 LEGALIST, http://www.legalist.us (last visited Nov. 17, 2016). 
3 Legalist is one of many finance firms across the globe investing in 
U.S. litigation. See also, JURIDICA, http://juridica-aml.com (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2016); BURFORD CAPITAL LTD., 
http://www.burfordcapital.com (last visited Nov. 17, 2016); CREDIT 
SUISSE, http://www.credit-suisse.com/us/en.html (last visited Nov. 
17, 2016); AMERICAN LEGAL FUNDING, 
http://www.americanlegalfunding.com (last visited Nov. 17, 2016); 
ADVOCATE CAPITAL, INC., http://www.advocatecapital.com (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2016); COUNSEL FINANCIAL, 
http://www.counselfinancial.com (last visited Nov. 17, 2016); 
EVERGREEN FUNDING GROUP, http://www.evergreen-funding.com 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2016); LAW FINANCE GROUP, INC., 
http://www.lawfinance.com (last visited Nov. 17, 2016); OXBRIDGE 
FINANCIAL GROUP LLC, http://www.oxbridgefg.com (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2016); RAPID FUNDS, http://rapidfunds.com (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2016); RD LEGAL CAPITAL, http://www.legalfunding.com 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2016); VIA LEGAL FUNDING, 
http://www.vialegalfinance.com (last visited Nov. 17, 2016). 
4 Hunt, supra note 4; see also Kalajdzic et. al., infra note 11, at 131 
(quoting a Baker McKenzie representative stating that the “typical 
[investors fee] would be between twenty and fifty percent of the 
damages, with a cap of three to four times the legal costs advanced 
by the funder”).  
5 See 14 C.J.S. Champerty and Maintenance §§ 1-2 (2017) (defining 
maintenance and champerty as claims of “officious intermeddling”).  
6 See generally ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, WHITE PAPER ON 
ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCE, 11-12 (2012), available at 
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investment-based litigation finance system has replaced them.7 
While the dramatic shift to embrace litigation financing may 
seem bizarre in a vacuum, there is no doubt that the stated 
motivations of the litigation lending movement are 
meritorious.8 It is undeniable, however, that the bedrock of the 
movement—for-profit capital investment—is potentially 
disagreeable in this context due to its propensity to raise ethical, 
evidentiary, adversarial, and representational concerns. 
TPLF works fine for the individual plaintiff. If an 
individual chooses to sell her potential recovery from a suit, 
why should our justice system prohibit it? American legal 
principals allow individuals to sell their structured settlements 
in favor of buy-out incentives.9 Moreover, our judiciary 
encourages risk/reward type sophistication when determining 
the value of a lawsuit.10 The economic foundation on which all 
legal decisions are made incentivizes unique problem solving 
                                                     
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/e
thics_2020/20111212_ethics_20_20_alf_white_paper_final_hod_infor
mational_report.authcheckdam.pdf.  (reporting that 27 out of 51 U.S. 
jurisdictions now permit some form of champerty or maintenance in 
situations of third party funding). 
7 Id. 
8 See Jasminka Kalajdzic, Peter Cashman, and Alana Longmoore, 
Justice for Profit: A Comparative Analysis of Australian, Canadian and 
U.S. Third Party Litigation Funding, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 93, 94 (2013) 
(citing New York City Bar Gives Thumbs Up to Litigation-Funding, 
THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (June 20, 2011), http://archive-
com.com/page/481471/2012-10-
19/http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2011
/06.  
9 See generally J.G. WENTWORTH, https://www.jgwentworth.com 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2016); PEACHTREE FINANCIAL, 
http://www.peachtreefinancial.com (last visited Nov. 17, 2016); 
SELL MY ANNUITY, http://www.sellmyannuity.net/ (last visited 
Sept. 12, 2017).  
10 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. § 13 (codifying the practice of 
crossclaim and counterclaim practice); 1 ALT. DISP. RESOL. § 7:1 (3d 
ed. 2016) (identifying the duties arising from arbitration 
agreements). 
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techniques to promote judicial frugality.11 Separate from 
“individual TPLF,” however, is third-party aggregate litigation 
finance (“TPALF”)—the next step for litigation financiers.12 
While it is true that the costs associated with aggregate 
litigation are far more than those associated with individual 
litigation, so too are the complications that arise during multi-
party, multi-jurisdiction lawsuits. For numerous reasons, 
applying TPLF to the practice of aggregate litigation fails to 
comport with the established legal norms in the U.S. The legal 
issues that arise when investors attempt to finance aggregate 
claims include—e.g. the exacerbation of privilege and 
confidentiality concerns inherent in complex litigation; the 
ability for aggregate defendants and other improper parties to 
invest in their opposing party claims; and the advancement of 
non-party interests—distinguish themselves as particularly 
unjustifiable.  
This article will explore the above-mentioned 
deficiencies of permitting TPLF in the aggregate context and 
ask whether applying litigation finance to aggregate claims is 
worth the risk of violating U.S. ethical and evidentiary rules, 
diluting adversarial principals, and creating representational 
concerns. Part I will outline the rise of litigation finance in the 
U.S. and briefly identify representative instances of individual 
TPLF and TPALF here in the states. Part II will identify three 
primary concerns presented by the creation of third party 
lending arrangements in aggregate litigation and briefly 
explain why each threatens the legitimacy of aggregate 
litigation. Finally, Part III proposes a blanket prohibition on 
TPALF arrangements pending the implementation of a 
                                                     
11 See generally 4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 7 (2016) 
(discussing mediation-arbitration arrangements); See Thomson 
Reuters Practical Law, Settlement Release of Claims Agreement. 
PRACTICAL LAW LABOR & EMPLOYMENT (2016). 
12 See Kalajdzic et. el., supra note 11, at 127 (explaining that while the 
TPLF market in the U.S. is a few decades old, “there does not appear 
to have been a reported instance of TPLF in the class actions 
context.”) 
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comprehensive regulatory scheme accounting for the concerns 
facing aggregate litigation lending.  
 
 
II. THE SPARK THAT IGNITED LITIGATION LENDING 
 
In the early history of law, there was a strong 
feeling not only that . . . the judges and two 
litigants [] were necessary [for a legal dispute] 
but that there must be no one else and that 
anyone who intruded himself between the judge 
and the parties could only mean mischief.13  
Problematically however, individuals who appeared before 
their peers “flanked by supporters” were traditionally believed 
to have “dignity and power,” whereas individuals “not so 
supported” appeared traditionally “miserable” and 
“wretch[ed] in the literal sense of both words.”14 For this and 
similar reasons, early legal systems created a caveat to the judge 
and two litigant rule to allow “intervention on behalf of 
another.”15 Throughout legal history, these third party 
intervenors (litigation speculators) have been looked upon with 
suspicion.16 In feudal England, Parliament developed the 
doctrines of “maintenance” and “champerty” to circumvent 
these suspicions.17 As was to be expected, English influence on 
U.S. law fostered the adoption of maintenance and champerty 
as a part of the early U.S. common law.18  
Champerty is defined as the “officious intermeddling in 
a suit by a stranger by maintaining or assisting either party with 
money or otherwise to prosecute or defend it.”19 Maintenance 
                                                     
13 Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CAL. L. REV. 48 (1935) 
(detailing the development of maintenance and champerty). 
14 Id. at 49. (discussing early Greek judiciaries and judiciaries 
throughout the middle ages). 
15 Id. (this encompassed the attorney and various other supporters). 
16 See generally id. 
17 Id. at 70.  
18 Id.  
19 14 C.J.S. Champerty and Maintenance § 1 (2016) (“[i]n order to 
establish a prima facie case of champerty, three elements must exist: 
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“is an officious intermeddling in a suit that in no way belongs 
to the intermeddler, by maintaining or assisting either party 
with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend it.”20 The 
purpose of these doctrines was to deter “financial overreaching 
by a party of superior bargaining position” and disincentivize 
the “bringing of frivolous lawsuits.”21 With the development of 
the statutory law in the U.S., however, “maintenance [was] lost 
[to] such specific torts as slander, libel, conspiracy, [and] 
malicious prosecution.”22 And, the antiquated doctrine of 
champerty has been almost completely outmoded by the 
contingency fee, a public policy against excessive fee recovery, 
sanctions for misconduct, and the doctrines of 
unconscionability, duress, and good faith.23 Even without 
maintenance and champerty, U.S. courts have been able to 
consider the excessiveness of fee arrangements and whether 
financiers impermissibly influence the outcome of a lawsuits. 
Ultimately, the development of the U.S. statutory law posed 
whether the doctrines of maintenance and champerty were 
necessary.  
As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said more than a 
century ago,  
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule 
of law than that so it was laid down in the time 
of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the 
grounds upon which it was laid down have 
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists 
from blind imitation of the past.24  
                                                     
the party involved must be one who has no legitimate interest in the 
suit; the party must expend its own money in prosecuting the suit; 
and the party must be entitled by the bargain to share in the 
proceeds of the suit” quoting WFIC, LLC v. LaBarre, 148 A.3d 812, 
818 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016)).  
20 Id. at § 2. 
21 Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1226 (Mass. 1997). 
22 Radin, supra note 16, at 59.   
23 Saladini, 687 N.E.2d at 1227.  
24 O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (Jan. 8, 
1897).  
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As a reflection of Justice Homes’s sentiment, many states have 
made the determination to abolish, repeal, or ignore25 the 
doctrines of maintenance and champerty. The shift mirrors the 
“change in [the societal] attitude toward the financing of 
litigation”26 and represents the realization that “agreements to 
purchase an interest in an action may actually foster resolution 
of [] dispute[s].”27 Some jurisdictions still prohibit maintenance 
and champerty in some capacity, but the majority of U.S. 
jurisdictions have recognized the social utility of third party 
litigation funding arrangements.28  
As a product of the deregulation of litigation lending,29 
and in conjunction with the American contingency fee, a system 
of TPLF developed within the United States to capitalize on the 
practicality and profitability of legal risk-shifting agreements.  
 
A.  UNITED STATES TPLF AND A FAILED ATTEMPT AT    
TPALF 
 
                                                     
25 In some states maintenance was never adopted or has been 
abandoned. See, e.g., Mathewson v. Fitch, 22 Cal. 86, 95 (1863); 
Fastenau v. Engel, 240 P.2d 1173, 1174-1175 (Colo. 1952); Grant v. 
Stecker & Huff, Inc., 1 N.W.2d 500, 501 (Mich. 1942); Bentinck v. 
Franklin, 38 Tex. 458, 472-73 (1873). In others, the doctrine has been 
given very narrow interpretation. See, e.g., Brown v. Bigne, 28 P. 11, 
13 (Or. 1891); Thurston v. Percival, 1 Pick. 415, 416-17 (1823); See 
generally ABA, supra note 9.  
26 Saladini, 687 N.E.2d at 1226. 
27 Id. 
28 Andrew Hananel & David Staubitz, The Ethics of Law Loans in the 
Post-Rancman Era, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 795, 801 (2003-2004) 
(pointing to New York, Pennsylvania, and Oklahoma as three of the 
jurisdictions that either statutorily prohibit maintenance and 
champerty or do so as a part of their common law); see also ABA, 
supra note 9.  
29 Kalajdzic et. al., supra note 11, at 134-35 (explaining the 
deregulation of maintenance and champerty in the U.S. in 
comparison to that of other countries, such as Australia. In Australia, 
maintenance and champerty are no longer torts or criminal offenses. 
By contrast, the United States has relatively few judicial decisions 
addressing these issues directly.); See also ABA, supra note 9.  
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As the legislative and judicial predisposition towards 
litigation lending changed in the United States, so too did the 
perception of foreign and domestic investors. Among the most 
explicit litigation financiers entering the U.S. market over the 
last two decades are Juridica, Burford Capital Ltd., American 
Legal Capital, Advocate Capital, Inc., Counsel Financial, 
Evergreen Funding Group, Law Finance Group, Inc., Oxbridge 
Financial Group LLC, Rapid Funds, RD Legal Capital, and Via 
Legal Funding.30 In addition to the bevy of litigation finance 
firms saturating the market, individual investors31 and novel 
start-ups, such as Legalist, regularly affect U.S. litigation.32  
“Investors are pumping unprecedented sums of money into 
financing litigation, lured by the prospect of payoffs untethered 
to economic or market conditions.”33 “To litigation funders, a 
lawsuit is [now] more than a dispute; it is an asset, just like any 
other receivable.”34 In its 2015 annual report, a representative of 
Burford Capital LLC, a publicly traded global finance firm, 
acknowledged that, “It may seem strange to think of litigation 
[as an asset], but if one strips away the drama and collateral 
dynamics associated with the litigation process, a litigation 
claim is nothing more than an effort to get money to change 
hands.”35 
                                                     
30 Steven Garber, Alternative Litigation Financing in the United States, 
RAND INSTITUTE OCCASIONAL PAPER, 13, 23 (2010) (in 2010, at least 
four new litigation funders entered the market); see William Alden, 
Looking to Make a Profit on Lawsuits, Firms Invest in Them, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 30, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/30/looking-
to-make-a-profit-on-lawsuits-firms-invest-in-them/. 
31 Sorkin, infra note 40.  
32 Lisa Rickard and Mark Behrens, Opinion: 3rd-Party Litigation 
Funding Needs Transparency, LAW360 (Oct. 17, 2016) 
http://www.law360.com/articles/852142/opinion-3rd-party-
litigation-funding-needs-transparency (discussing TPLF trends). 
33 Id.  
34 Id.  
35 Id.; Problematically only a few states have enacted legislation 
restraining the otherwise untethered practice of TPLF. See OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (2009) (allowing restricted TPLF and striking 
down the Ohio Supreme Court case of Rancman v. Interim 
Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 2003) where the 
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While the intricacies of each litigation lending 
arrangement may vary dramatically across the spectrum of 
litigation lending cases (many of which are never revealed), the 
case of Boella v. Gawker Media, LLC36 offers a representative 
instance of how TPLF works in some U.S. jurisdictions. Terry 
Gene Boella (a/k/a Hulk Hogan) sued Gawker Media in 2012 
for releasing, without his consent, footage of an adulterous 
encounter between himself and a married woman.37 A Florida 
jury awarded Boella $140 million in personal injury damages 
for invasion of privacy.38 Unbeknownst to the judge, jury, 
opposing counsel, or Gawker, however, Boella received pre-
trial financial support from an outside investor to insure that he 
could go the distance with Gawker.39 Tech billionaire Peter 
Thiel invested $10 million in Boella’s lawsuit, providing him 
with the funding to oppose the profitable online media 
company.40 Thiel described his interest in financing Boella’s 
claim as a “philanthropic” venture against journalistic bullying 
and underscored that he did not “expect to make any money 
from [the investment].”41 Due to Thiel’s negative personal 
relationship with Gawker, however,42 some believe that the 
Silicon Valley billionaire had a potential agenda driven by 
                                                     
Court found an arrangement of maintenance that disincentivized 
settlement practices); see also 9-A ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 9-A, §§ 
12-104, 12-106.  
36 Boella v. Gawker Media, LLC, 913 F. Supp. 2d. 1325 (M.D. Fl. 
2012).  
37 Id. at 1326. 
38 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Peter Thiel, Tech Billionaire, Reveals Secret War 
with Gawker, THE N.Y. TIMES, (May 25, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/26/business/dealbook/peter-
thiel-tech-billionaire-reveals-secret-war-with-gawker.html?r=0.  
39 Id. 
40 Id. (Thiel is Silicone Valley entrepreneur, a co-founder of PayPal 
and one of the first investors in Facebook). 
41 Id.  
42 Id. (In 2007, Gawker’s Valleywag blog published an article 
headlined “Peter Thiel is totally gay, people” essentially “outing 
Thiel as gay.” Owen Thomas, Peter Thiel is totally gay, people, 
GAWKER: VALLEYWAG, Dec. 19, 2017, 
http://gawker.com/335894/peter-thiel-is-totally-gay-people). 
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revenge, personal dislike, or principal.43  While Thiel denies that 
his investment in Boella’s claim was retaliatory, it is more likely 
that his personal dealings with Gawker had some role to play 
in his decision making process.44  
The Boella-Thiel arrangement has many characteristics 
typical of an American TPLF agreement. In general, an 
agreement of this type is fairly simple,45 requiring only that an 
investor evaluate the risk of an individual lawsuit and propose 
a return for her support, usually in a nonrecourse loan.46 It 
involves only an investor and a holder of a claim.47 Its details 
remain shrouded in secrecy, as the general terms were revealed 
only after the conclusion of litigation.48 The expediency with 
which such arrangements can be made is surprising. In TPLF 
determinations, “funders minimally screen claims to determine 
whether to offer funding” in a routinized business model 
“handling a high volume of similar cases without much, if any, 
individualized treatment”49 With the success and profitability50 
                                                     
43 Id.  
44 Id. (Regardless, we will never know. Due to the lack of TPLF 
regulation, there is no requirement that the motives of third party 
investors be discussed or investigated). 
45 Legalist, supra note 6 (visit the website of any litigation lender and 
you will find that it promises a “cash now” pledge in return for a 
nonrecourse promise to pay a percentage of the potential damage 
award); It should be noted that the nonrecourse nature of litigation 
loans, while not the subject of this article, is key to bypass usury 
(lending money at an unusually high rate) law. 
46 See generally Deborah R. Hensler, Third-Party Financing of Class 
Action Litigation in the United States: Will the Sky Fall?, 63 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 499 (2014). 
47 See id. at 501-02. (outlining a distinction between individual tort 
lending and commercial lending). 
48 See Fausone v. U.S. Claims, Inc., 915 So. 2d. 626 (Fl. 2005) 
(representing a situation where the litigation lending arrangement 
was revealed because the holder of the claim refused to pay the 
investor); Sorkin, supra note 41 (Thiel’s involvement in the Gawker 
litigation only revealed itself after the jury verdict. The existence of 
many of these arrangements are likely never reveled). 
49 Hensler, supra note 49, at 502.  
50 Id. (noting that investors are drawn to the market by its potential 
for high rates of return per claim on a large volume of loans).  
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of TPLF in the U.S., such as the Theil-Boella one, investors now 
have an eye toward expanding TPLF to aggregate and 
commercial claims. 
Due to the secrecy (and potentially the uncertainty) of 
litigation lending arrangements, there are few examples of 
American litigation lending in the aggregate context.51 One 
such example, however, exists in the form of the Ecuadorian 
environmental damages litigation against Chevron—Aguinda v. 
Texaco, Inc.52 In Aguinda, the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York refused to certify a class on behalf of 
Ecuadorian residents of the Amazon.53  
After nine years of litigation in federal court, the 
suit was dismissed on forum non conveniens. 
Two years later, a new suit arising out of the 
same factual allegations was filed in Ecuador by 
a group of Ecuadorians that included some of 
the original class representatives . . . . [T]he 
provincial court in Sucumbíos, Ecuador issued 
an $18 billion judgement against Chevron, 
which was upheld (although ultimately slashed 
in half) by Ecuador’s appellate court. By 2010 
Chevron was back in the U.S. courts, pursuing 
charges of fraud in the Ecuadorian litigation, 
seeking a preemptive injunction against 
enforcement of the Ecuadorian judgment, and 
ultimately bringing RICO charges against 
[plaintiffs’ counsel]. . . . In late 2010, with 
plaintiffs' attorney [] apparently having 
depleted his resources and the Ecuadorian 
                                                     
51 Hensler, supra note 49, at 505 (“It appears that only one class action 
initiative in the United States has secured third-party litigation 
financing”); Kalajdzic et. at., supra note 11, at 127 (stating that “there 
does not appear to have been a reported instance of TPLF in the class 
actions context”). 
52 Hensler, supra note 49, at 505 (citing Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 1994 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4718 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994)).  
53 Id. (citing Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625, 626–27 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated, Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 
1998)). 
58                           5 LMU LAW REVIEW 1 (2017) 
provincial court in Sucumbíos yet to deliver its 
judgment, Patton Boggs received $4 million in 
funding from third-party litigation financer 
Burford Capital Ltd. to take over the case. Patton 
Boggs LLP, a fifty-year-old Washington, D.C. 
firm that describes itself as a “public policy” law 
firm with roots in international trade and 
business law, agreed to represent the 
Ecuadorian plaintiffs on a contingency fee basis. 
. . . Burford was said to have committed a 
maximum of $15 million to the litigation and 
reportedly hedged its investment by selling the 
initial $4 million share to another entity. A year 
later, Burford announced that it would not 
invest further in the Ecuadorian litigation. . . . 
Chevron's lawyers filed a letter dated September 
2011 from Burford to [the plaintiffs’ attorney] 
accusing him and the plaintiffs of fraud, 
pursuant to Chevron's ongoing RICO litigation 
against [the plaintiff’s attorney]. Burford 
subsequently charged that [a member of Patton 
Boggs, LLP] had provided the firm with a 
misleading analysis of the case.54  
                                                     
54 Id. (citing citing Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d as modified, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002); Chevron 
Corp. v. The Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 34877, UNCITRAL 
Arbitration, Interim Award (Dec. 1, 2008), available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case- 
documents/ita0150.pdf; citing also, Chevron Corp. v. The Republic 
of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, UNCITRAL Arbitration, 
Claimant’s Notice of Arbitration (Sept. 23, 2009), available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita01550.pdf; PRESS RELEASE, AMAZON WATCH, CHEVRON 
GUILTY VERDICT UPHELD BY ECUADOR APPELLATE COURT, Jan. 4, 2011, 
available at http://amazonwatch.org/news/2012/0104-chevron-
guilty-verdict- upheld-by-ecuador-appellate-court; Steven Donziger, 
et al., Rainforest Chernobyl Revisited: The Clash of Human Rights and BIT 
Investor Claims: Chevron's Abusive Litigation in Ecuador, HUM. RTS. 
BRIEF, Winter 2010, at 8; Patrick Radden Keefe, Reversal of Fortune, 
NEW YORKER, January 9, 2012, at 38; Michael Goldhaber, The Global 
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The attempted application of TPLF to the aggregate Boggs-
Burford arrangement left in its wake lawsuits against the 
plaintiffs and the original plaintiffs’ counsel, Steven Donziger, 
for fraud; tortious interference allegations against Chevron for 
improperly influencing the class investor, Burford;55 and 
substantial monetary and public-image losses for the investor, 
Burford.56 
While the Burford TPALF arrangement seems like an 
exaggerated worst-case scenario for TPALF investors,57 it 
illustrates the complex array of issues that arise when applying 
TPLF to aggregate litigation. The utter failure of the Burford 
arrangement, one of the only public instances of TPALF in the 
U.S.,58 has deterred many investors from “flock[ing] to [] high-
                                                     
Lawyer: Latest Twists in Chevron's Amazon Case Run Through Latin 
America, AM. LAW. (Nov. 12, 2012), 
http://www.americanlawyer.com/digestTAL.jsp? 
id=1202578138704&The_Global_Lawyer_Latest_Twists_in_Chevrons
_Amazon_Case_Run_Through_Latin_America); Alison Frankel, Can 
Ecuadorean Plaintiffs Keep Funding Case Against Chevron?, REUTERS 
(Dec. 12, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-
frankel/2011/12/12/can-ecuadorean-plaintiffs-keep-funding-case-
against-chevron/; Roger Parloff, Litigation Finance Firm in Chevron 
Case Says It Was Duped by Patton Boggs, CNN MONEY, Apr. 17, 2013, 
http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2013/04/17/burford-patton-
boggs-chevron-suit/). 
55 Id. quoting James Tyrell, Jr., Paton Boggs, LLP, “Chevron made it 
clear that there would be repercussions if [Burford] continued [its] 
funding.”). 
56 Id. (these arrangements are secretive that we may never know of 
the exact value of the losses sustained by Burford). 
57 See Tyler W. Hill, Financing the Class: Strengthening the Class Action 
Through Third-Party Investment, 125 YALE L.J. 484, 528 (2015) 
(providing a sarcastic recognition of the negative value suit by a 
TPALF proponent). 
58 See also Binyamin Appelbaum, Betting on Justice; Putting Money on 
Lawsuits, Investors Share in the Payouts, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2010). 
(Describing the non-class World Trade Centre Respiratory Illness 
lawsuit brought on behalf of ground zero workers funded by 
Counsel Financial in the form of a loan to Napoli Bern LLP. The case 
eventually settled for $712.5 million, and the lenders earned 
approximately $11 million). 
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value mass litigation against multinational corporations.”59 
However, the success of TPALF in Australia, Canada, and the 
U.K.,60 and the profitability of individual TPLF arrangements in 
the U.S, has encouraged investors and scholars alike to 
rationalize TPALF practice with U.S. law.61 Even though the 
particular effect TPLF and TPALF arrangements have had on 
the U.S. market is difficult to quantify due to their secretive 
nature, the “marked increases in the number of funders 
entering the market” over the last decade clarifies that the 
litigation lending business is booming.62 
 
III. TRANSITIONING FROM TPLF TO TPALF 
 
In theory, the same reasoning that applies to TPLF 
should also apply to TPALF arrangements. Although 
champertous, TPALF arrangements, like their individual TPLF 
counterparts, radiate at least a modicum of social usefulness.63 
Unlike TPLF arrangements, though, TPALF agreements 
implicate ethical, evidentiary, adversarial, and representational 
concerns not contemplated in the individual TPLF context. 
In theory, there are four categories of investment within 
the world of U.S. litigation finance.64 The first category is TPLF 
                                                     
59 Hensler, supra note 49, at 507 (stating “Juridica has consistently 
stated that it will not provide financing for class action lawsuits”).  
60 See generally, Kalajdzic et. al., supra note 11 (for the differences in 
U.S., Canadian and Australian TPLF). 
61 See generally supra note 3 (for several scholarly attempts to 
rationalize TPALF with U.S. law). 
62 Kalajdzic et. al., supra note 11, at 127.  
63 See Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1226 (Mass. 1997) 
(explaining the social usefulness of litigation lending arrangements). 
64 Other authors propose that only three distinct categories of TPLF 
arrangements exist. But see Kalajdzic et. al., supra note 11, at 128-29 
(citing Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim is this Anyway?: Third Party 
Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268 (2011); Garber, supra note 
33; Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate 
Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1306 (2012); ABA, supra note 9, at 
7).  
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“fee investing.”65 TPLF fee investing occurs when an investor 
personally finances an attorney or her law practice in return for 
a percentage of the attorney’s fees in a case. Second, TPLF 
“relief investing” occurs when an individual claim holder sells 
a portion or all of her potential relief to an outside investor to 
shift the risk of loss.66 Third, TPALF “fee investing” usually 
occurs in the class action context when class counsel receives 
funding from a third party investor to survive class certification 
and/or litigation.67 In return, the outside investor receives a 
percentage of the attorney’s contingency fee.68 Finally, TPALF 
“relief investing” only differs from TPLF relief investing in 
scope.69 Where TPLF relief investing involves one claim holder 
with one claim, TPALF relief investing is repeated many times 
with many aggregate claim holders.  
Each of these investments, while similar, pose their own 
unique legal hurdles when contemplated in the context of a U.S. 
based lawsuit.70 For example, TPALF fee investing 
arrangements, if revealed, may have implications on a judge’s 
lead counsel determination, either positively or negatively.71 
TPLF fee investment arrangements, do not affect a judge’s 
                                                     
65 Id. at 128 (referring to this type of investing as “loans to lawyers or 
law firms”).  
66 Id. (referring to this type of loan as a “nonrecourse loan made 
directly to [the] plaintiff”). 
67 Id. (referring to this type of loan as “funding of complex or 
commercial claims”). 
68 See generally id. 
69 Id. (Kalajdzic et. al. either contemplates this category of investment 
within TPLF “relief investing” or fails to recognize the separation 
between aggregate plaintiffs and individual plaintiffs. I bifurcate 
here to reflect the fundamental differences in aggregate plaintiffs 
and individual plaintiffs as well as the distinct issues that arise when 
applying TPLF to each). 
70 See generally id. (explaining the differences between the U.S., 
Australian, and Canadian approach to TPALF, including Canadian 
TPLF disclosure requirements and the Australian abolishment of the 
contingency fee and its use of a “loser pays” adversarial system). 
71 Id. at 133-34 (citing a conversation with Ralph Sutton, CEO of 
Bentham Capital, stating that when a law firm discloses its need for 
third party financing to support its representation, it impairs its 
chances of being selected as lead counsel in a class action). 
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determination of counsel. Similarly, the individual consent of 
the claim holder exists as an ethical barrier in TPLF relief 
investing arrangements.72 However, due to the nature of 
aggregate claims, an attorney entering into a TPALF relief 
investing arrangement should be required to gather the consent 
of all similarly situated claimants before entering into the 
arrangement.73   
While there are deficiencies in TPLF fee and relief 
investing (category one and two),74 the shift away from 
maintenance and champerty toward litigation lending acts as 
society’s recognition and acceptance of those deficiencies. 
However, TPALF fee and relief investing arrangements present 
countless insufficiencies that cannot be overcome by the social 
utility of risk sharing arrangements. Difficulties such as the 
perpetuation of false class support and the risk of higher 
recovery for undeserving classes,75 and the political attack on 
contingency fee litigation remain in the background of almost 
every TPALF discussion.76 The most glaring concerns that 
TPALF arrangements implicate, however, are  (A) the 
exacerbation of privilege and confidentiality issues inherent in 
                                                     
72 See generally ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 
1.6 (explaining that client information can be shared with a third 
party with the informed consent of the client).  
73 See generally id.; Hensler, supra note 49, at 515 (proposing that 
judicial oversight and Rule 23(e)(3) could cure this specific 
perplexity).  
74 Specifically, the traditional normative concerns about maintenance 
and champerty, and the lack of transparency inherent in these 
arrangements. See Rickard et. al., supra note 35. 
75 See Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 
1200 (2013) (recognizing what Professor Hensler calls the “in 
terrorem effect of class actions” and their propensity to affect the 
settlement of frivolous class actions); but see Hensler, supra note 49, at 
511 (theorizing the non-existence of a rise in frivolous class action 
settlements). 
76 See JOHN BEISNER ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, 
SELLING LAWSUITS, BUYING TROUBLE: THIRD PARTY LITIGATION 
FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES (2009), available at 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/thirdpar
tylitigationfinancing.pdf; see also Hensler, supra note 49, at 511-12 
(acknowledging, and rejecting, similar TPALF concerns).  
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aggregate litigation; (B) the ability of aggregate defendants and 
other improper parties to invest in their opposing party’s claim; 
and (C) the advancement of non-party interests to the detriment 
of claim holder.  
 
A.  THE EXACERBATION OF PRIVILEGE AND  
CONFIDENTIALITY CONCERNS INTRINSIC IN COMPLEX 
LITIGATION 
 
Investing is not gambling. Gambling requires only that 
an individual hedge a bet relying on luck and/or chance for a 
return. Investing requires thoughtful analysis of information. 
Investopedia explains that  
[t]rue investing doesn't happen without some 
action on [the part of the investor]. A ‘real’ 
investor does not simply throw his or her money 
at any random investment; he or she performs 
thorough analysis and commits capital only 
when there is a reasonable expectation of profit. 
Yes, there still is risk, and there are no 
guarantees, but investing is more than simply 
hoping Lady Luck is on your side.77  
The larger the risk (aggregate claims are structurally risk laden), 
the more information an investor must gather to make a 
comfortable investment. Litigation investment is no different. 78 
Capital investments by sophisticated investors, which are the 
type of investors that would be interested in funding an 
                                                     
77 Investopedia Staff, Investing 101: What Is Investing?, INVESTOPEDIA 
(2017), 
http://www.investopedia.com/university/beginner/beginner1.asp
#ixzz4PxLviQsz.  
78 This Article primarily focuses on “for-profit investing,” and, as a 
default position, presumes as much of third-party litigation 
financing. The author does recognize that all investing is not based 
on capital profit. Spirted advocates eager to subsidize religious, 
ethical, and moral movements - regardless of capital profit - may 
invest in litigation to achieve a non-capital outcome. This type of 
“nonprofit investing”, however, seems rare amid the profit driven 
litigation lenders entering the U.S. TPLF market. See supra note 6. 
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aggregate claim, are driven by the availability of data and 
information. Ethical and evidentiary concerns arise when the 
data and information sought by investors is confidential and/or 
privileged.  
 
i. ETHICAL CONCERNS PRESENTED BY THE 
DISSEMINATION OF CONFIDENTIAL AGGREGATE 
INFORMATION 
 
In the individual TPLF context many of the ethical woes 
presented by the privilege and confidentiality doctrines can be 
cured by giving notice to, and receiving consent from, the claim 
holder.79 Distributing notice and receipt of consent, however, 
become painstakingly challenging in the context of TPALF fee 
investing, and insufficient in the context of TPALF relief 
investing. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct require 
that “[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the 
representation of a client unless the client gives informed 
consent.”80 The rule does not distinguish between aggregate 
and individual claimants, thus if privileged information is 
disseminated in an aggregate fee investing arrangement, the 
attorney must first have consent from all affected claimants. 
When there are hundreds (if not thousands) of claimants across 
numerous jurisdictions with varying degrees of interest in the 
claim, notifying and receiving consent from all claim holders 
before entering into an information/data based fee investing 
arrangement is very unlikely, but necessary under the ethical 
rules.81  
The relationship that develops between a claim holder 
and a relief investor may also require consent from other 
similarly situated claimants. Depending on the identity of the 
investor, the motivations behind the relief investing 
arrangement, the information/data required by the investor, 
                                                     
79 See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 1.6 
(including an exception to disclose confidential information with 
consent of the client). 
80 Id.  
81 Id. 
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and the characteristics of all other similarly situated claimants, 
the relief investing arrangement could severely disadvantage 
other claimants.82 To avoid conflict among aggregate claimants, 
consent is required of all claimants before distinct 
information/data based TPALF relief investing arrangements 
may be entered into.83  
 
ii. EVIDENTIARY CONCERNS PRESENTED BY THE 
DISSEMINATION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 
 
In their article Justice for Profit: A Comparative Analysis of 
Australian, Canadian and U.S. Third Party Litigation Funding, 
Professor Jasminka Kalajdzic, Dr. Peter Cashman, and Alana 
Longmoore characterize the integrity of the lawyer-client 
relationship primarily as an “ethical concern.”84 While the 
intervention of a third party into the attorney-client relationship 
raises ethical issues (discussed in PART II. A. i.),85 these 
arrangements present equally problematic evidentiary 
concerns. Violating the ethical duty of confidentiality and/or 
the breach of privilege might cause formal disciplinary 
proceedings by the American Bar Association,86 but the 
evidentiary implications of breaching confidentiality and 
privilege will produce a legal malpractice lawsuit.87   
It is axiomatic within the legal profession that all 
communications between the attorney and client are protected 
by the attorney-client privilege.88 Likewise, all documents 
                                                     
82 See id. at 1.7 (stating “a lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest”); See also 
Part II C.  
83 Id. at 1.7(b)(4); See generally MoneyForLawsuits V LP v. Rowe, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43633 (E.D. Mich. March 29, 2012) (as an example of 
a relief investing arrangement within an aggregate claim). 
84 Kalajdzic et al., supra note 11, at 134.  
85 See ABA, supra note 92. 
86 Id. at 8.4.  
87 John T. Seale, Legal Ethics: A New Column, 42 LA. B. J. 283 (1994) 
(briefly discussing the distinction between misconduct and 
malpractice). 
88 FED. R. EVID. 502. 
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prepared in anticipation of litigation are protected as 
confidential by the attorney work product doctrine.89 All attorney-
client communications and work product created in 
anticipation of litigation are protected from discovery.90 A 
privilege does not exist, however, for attorney-investor or 
investor-claimant communications, nor does there exist a 
doctrine to protect investor work product from prying eyes. In 
theory, when an attorney propagates privileged or confidential 
information to an investor it becomes discoverable.91  
Clever attorneys have attempted to circumvent 
discovery by utilizing the “common interest exception” to the 
attorney-client privilege. The common interest doctrine was 
originally contemplated to “permit[] represented parties who 
shared a common legal interest to exchange privileged 
information in a confidential manner for the purpose of 
obtaining legal advice without waiving the attorney-client 
privilege” (emphasis added).92 This exception was usually 
reserved to allow co-defendants an opportunity to exchange 
privileged information.93 The extension of the common interest 
exception to third-party litigation funders has been met with 
mixed reactions. In Leaders Technologies, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., the 
United States District Court for the District of Delaware rejected 
“the common interest exception to [the] attorney-client 
privilege and ordered disclosure of documents shared with 
funders during discussions about potential TPLF 
arrangements.”94 In Mondis Technology Ltd. v. LG Electronics, 
                                                     
89 Id.; ABA, supra note 90.  
90 FED. R. EVID. 502. 
91 Kalajdzic et. al., supra note 11, at 136 (noting that confidentiality 
and nondisclosure agreements do not insulate information from 
discovery). 
92 Katherine Traylor Schaffzin, An Uncertain Priviege: Why the 
Common Interest Doctrine Does Not Work and How Uniformity Can Fix 
It, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 49 (2005). 
93 Id. at 51. 
94 Kalajdzic et. al., supra note 11, at 137 (citing Leader Technologies, 
Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 373 (D. Del. 2010)); see also Bray 
& Gillespie Management LLC v. Lexington Insurance Co., 2008 WL 
5054695, 2 (M.D. Fla. 2008). 
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Inc., the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Texas “found that disclosure of such documents to potential 
funders did not waive work product privilege.”95 The “question 
of whether any communication with the [investor] would be 
protected by privilege is also unsettled”96  
In a recent article, the CEO of Burford Capital, 
Christopher P. Bogart, shrugged off the evidentiary concerns 
presented by disclosing confidential information to litigation 
financiers.97 According to Bogart, “several decisions have 
recently confirmed that work product shared with a litigation 
financier under a confidentiality agreement remains 
privileged.”98 While facially true, Bogart’s statement must be 
contextualized. Bogart as the chief executive officer of one of the 
largest litigation financing firms in the world obviously harbors 
a bias toward the subject. More problematically, Bogart’s self-
serving article fails to mention the existence of conflicting case 
law, and runs contrary to statements by other litigation 
investment firms that have indicated that they do not actively 
seek access to information within the scope of the attorney-
client privilege when performing due diligence prior to funding 
a claim.99 Regardless of its context, Bogart’s article reveals an 
important aspect of TPLF (and logically TPALF) arrangements 
- both proponents and opponents of TPALF recognize that 
                                                     
95 Kaljdzic et. al., supra note 11, at 137 (citing Mondis Technology Ltd. 
v. LG Electronics, Inc., 2011 WL 1714304 (E.D. Tex. May 4, 2011)). 
96 Kaljdzic et. al., supra note 11, at 136 (citing Bray & Gillespie Mgmt. 
LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co., 6:07CV222-ORL-35KRS, 2008 WL 5054695, 
at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2008).  
97 Christopher P. Bogart, The Case for Litigation Financing, 42 LITIG. 46, 
49 (2016).  
98 Id.  
99 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,  COMMENTS TO ALTERNATIVE 
LITIGATION FINANCING WORKING GROUP ISSUES PAPER, AMERICAN 
BAR ASSOCIATION COMMENTS (2011), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_
build/ethics_2020/comments_on_alternative_litigation_financing_is
sues_paper.authcheckdam.pdf (ALFA, Juridica and Oasis Legal 
Finance have all indicated that they do not seek access to 
information covered by the attorney-client privilege when 
performing due diligence prior to funding a claim). 
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investors cannot accurately calculate risk without the 
dissemination of privileged and/or confidential information.100 
Whether this dissemination subjects attorneys and claimants to 
the risk of evidentiary exposure is far more unclear than Bogart 
suggests. As with many aspects of litigation lending, this 
uncertainty becomes even more indefinite when considered in 
the vacuum of TPALF where extensive case law does not exist. 
 
B. REVOLUTIONIZING RISK MITIGATION THROUGH 
IMPROPER INVESTMENT  
 
The lack of transparency that defines almost every TPLF 
and TPALF arrangement in the U.S.101 makes it almost 
impossible to determine who is actually investing in litigation. 
In his article Auctioning Class Settlements, Professor Jay 
Tidmarsh identifies “five types” of potential TPALF investors, 
which he calls bidders.102 First, and most obvious, law firms 
may choose to invest their internal resources to continue 
litigation.103 Second, private equity firms (i.e. litigation lenders) 
could emerge as a potential class of investors engaged in the 
financing of claims.104 Third, consumer advocacy groups or 
other nonprofit groups may invest in a claim with an interest in 
regulating the defendant’s conduct.105 Fourth, the defendant’s 
competitors may invest in a plaintiff’s claim to affect the 
economic market in which the defendant and the competitor 
                                                     
100 See generally Hensler, supra note 49, at 518 (recognition TPALF’s 
incompatibility with the doctrines of privilege and confidentiality by 
a TPALF supporter); see also Bogart, supra note 109, at 49. 
101 Kalajdzic et. al., supra note 11, at 128 (distinguishing between 
disclosure requirements in Canada and the lack of such 
requirements in the U.S.). 
102 Jay Tidmarsh, Auctioning Class Settlements, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
227, 257 (2014) (Professor Tidmarsh identifies 5 categories of 
“bidders” but the same categories can be used to identify the types 
of “investors” that may pursue TPALF). 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
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operates.106 And, finally, the defendant itself may invest in a 
plaintiff’s claim to more effectively allocate risk.107  
As a fundamental principal of law in common law 
countries—including the United States—legal disputes must be 
adversarial.108 If any investor, other than a law firm, finances a 
legal claim, it should raise suspicion of whether that investor 
has an ulterior motive, including—but not limited to—
pecuniary gain, for her involvement in the lawsuit. The 
potential for adversarial abuse has grown exponentially with 
the introduction of litigation lending in the United States, 
because litigation lending firms may be owned by 
multinational corporations109 or operate under various 
subsidiaries,110 the probability of someone with a non-
adversarial or economic incentive to exist on both sides of the 
transaction is more likely than ever.  
Professor Tidmarsh, in discussing his proposition of a 
class settlement auction,111 simply dismisses the notion that a 
defendant would want to bid against her own settlement offer, 
                                                     
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 But see Abraham S. Goldstein & Martin Marcus, The Myth of 
Judicial Supervision in Three “Inquisitorial” Stems: France, Italy, and 
Germany, 87 YALE L. J. 240 (1977) (distinguishing common law 
judiciaries from inquisitorial judiciaries where the court takes an active 
role in investigating facts).  
109 See Binyamin Applebaum, Putting Money on Lawsuits, Investors 
Share in the Payouts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/15/business/15lawsuit.html?p
agewanted=all&_r=0. (disclosing that Counsel Financial is believed 
to be owned by Citigroup); but see counselfinancial.com (failing to 
mention its relationship to Citigroup). 
110 See BURFORD CAPITAL, LLC, 
http://www.burfordcapital.com/burford-capital-llc-2016/ (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2017). (stating that it operates through subsidiaries 
in numerous countries. Note that the website fails to outline the 
distinctions between Burford entities). 
111 Tidmarsh, supra note 116 (discussing the investment by a 
defendant in a plaintiff’s claim in the vacuum of his proposed class 
settlement auction scheme and not in the context of investment 
generally).  
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therefore existing on both sides of the transaction.112 While 
fairly nuanced, however, such a proposition is not unheard of. 
In hostile business takeovers, corporate raiders (i.e. hostile 
investors) purchase shares directly from individual 
shareholders to circumvent negotiations with an unfavorable 
board of directors.113 This allows the corporate raider (the 
investor) to acquire an otherwise un-acquirable asset. 
Analogously, when settlement negotiations break down in 
aggregate claims, aggregate defendants may consider 
purchasing portions of the lawsuit to force settlement or 
mitigate risk at a more favorable cost. For example, assume that 
Aggregate Class A sues Company C. Company C offers a $10 
million settlement to the members of Aggregate Class A, but 
due to the resiliency of class counsel and a majority of class 
members, Aggregate Class A decides that it wants to take the 
lawsuit to trial. Company C may approach risk averse 
individual members of the class and purchase portions of the 
class claim at the rate of its settlement, or below, to reduce its 
overall exposure to negative judgement or to influence the 
pendency of litigation from both sides of the claim. By creating 
similar interests on each side of a dispute, aggregate defendants 
can bypass the common law requirement of adversarial 
adjudication.  
Similar incentives exist for market competitors to invest 
against aggregate defendants. Suppose a smartphone 
manufacturer (such as Samsung) is sued for product 
defectiveness. Market competitors (such as Apple) may seize 
the opportunity presented by high cost, high profile aggregate 
litigation to deal an economic blow to a market opponent. 
“Competitors may have a legitimate reason to pursue a claim 
against the defendant. For example, the defendant may be 
engaged in slipshod practices that are negatively affecting the 
                                                     
112 Id. 
113 This usually occurs after merger/acquisition offers have been 
rejected by the board. See generally Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 
(Del. 1964) (as a representative instance of an attempted hostile 
takeover). 
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industry.”114 On the other hand, “the purpose of the suit may be 
nefarious: a better financed competitor may see an opportunity 
to drive up the defendant's costs through prolonged litigation, 
or even to bankrupt the company.”115 As professor Tidmarsh 
explains “In theory, abuse of process and antitrust laws prevent 
[nefarious litigation,]116 but proving an illegitimate motive is 
difficult and would consume significant resources.”117  
To harmonize TPALF with the adversarial nature of 
common law jurisdictions, professor Deborah Hensler suggests 
that judicial oversight and the requirements of Rule 23(e)(3) 
would deter improper parties from investing in aggregate 
claims.118 Professor Hensler’s suggestion, although novel, 
contains integral flaws. First, Rule 23(e) only applies to class 
action settlements.119 If the aggregate claim is a non-class 
action,120 or if it does not involve “settlement, voluntary 
dismissal, or compromise” then Rule 23(e) does not require the 
disclosure of funding arrangements.121 Second, even when a 
TPALF arrangement exists in the context of a class action and 
under the pretense of settlement, dismissal, or compromise, 
judiciaries have no reason to suspect that an impermissible 
funding arrangement exists, and no mechanism for compelling 
disclosure of such an arrangement. The threat of post hoc 
reprimands fails to provide a real reprimand for the discovery 
of these inappropriate TPALF arrangements. Therefore, Rule 
23(e)(3) fails to curtail inappropriate funding arrangements.  
Because no regulatory effort has been made to 
                                                     
114 Tidmarsh, supra note 116, at 258 (citing Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. 
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1972)). 
115 Id.  
116 Id. (citing Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 
472 (7th Cir. 1982)). 
117 Id.  
118 Hensler, supra note 49, at 515. 
119 FED. R. EVID. 23(e). 
120 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPALS OF LAW: AGGREGATE 
LITIGATION, §1.02 (2010) (giving various non-class aggregate claims 
including: derivative law suits, inventory settlement, and 
bankruptcy proceedings).  
121 FED. R. EVID. 23(e). 
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safeguard TPALF arrangements from inappropriate 
intervention, and because Rule 23(e)(3) lacks the inclusivity and 
disciplinary authority to curtail the interposition of such 
arrangements, the intervention of aggregate defendants and 
market competitors into aggregate litigation lending 
arrangements poses a considerable threat to the adversarial 
nature of litigation in the U.S. 122 
 
C. CREATING CONFLICTS: THE ADVANCEMENT OF NON-
PARTY INTERESTS TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE CLAIM 
HOLDER (THE AGENCY COST PROBLEM) 
 
The TPLF movement signifies an improved access to 
justice for claimants and attorneys without the financial 
fortitude to oppose deep-pocketed corporations.123  The TPLF 
access to justice movement relies, to some extent, on the belief 
that most attorneys have limited financial means and limited 
risk appetites.124 TPALF proponents theorize that economic 
incentives to settle “smother some potentially meritorious 
claims in their infancy because lawyers are unable or unwilling 
to front the costs required to pursue them in court.”125 Some 
scholars have referred to this failure to achieve a claims 
potential as the “agency cost” of aggregate representation.126 
When a principal holds an asset and places it in the hands of an 
agent, the agent may have an “incentive to maximize personal 
profit rather than the profit of the principal.”127 In the litigation 
context, the principal is the client, the asset is the legal claim, 
and the agent is the attorney. Attorneys are presumed to settle 
claims at lower negotiated values due to their own pecuniary 
                                                     
122 Id.  
123 See generally Hill, Hensler, Tidmarsh, Kalajdzic, Lyon supra note 3 
(for a list of articles referring to TPLF as an access to justice 
movement); see also Carlyn Kolker, New York City Bar Gives Thumbs 
Up to Litigation-Funding, NAT'L LEGAL NEWS FROM REUTERS, June 20, 
2011.  
124 Hill, supra note 3, at 486. 
125 Id. at 500. 
126 Tidmarsh, supra note 116, at 233.  
127 Id.; see also Hill, supra note 68, at 503. 
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interests in risk laden claims. These “low-ball” assessments 
occur to the detriment of the claimant. TPALF supporters 
speculate that injecting third party investors/bidders into the 
representational equation will incentivize the accurate 
appraisal of aggregate claims and encourage meritorious claims 
to proceed through litigation.128 While the accessibility of 
alternative funding is admittedly practical, further 
privatization of aggregate litigation finance would likely 
amplify the agency problem characteristic in legal 
representation.  
By introducing a greater number of interests—let alone 
nonrecourse financial interests—into the class funding 
calculus,129 TPALF arrangements create a greater incentive to 
settle at the lowest rate of profit. Aggregate litigation finance 
parallels two comparable markets in the U.S. First, TPALF is 
almost identical to the U.S. securities market.130 The New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE), the NASDAQ (an “over the counter 
market”), and other securities exchanges provide a platform for 
trading risk and reward for capital just like litigation lending. 
Like litigation lending, securities trading ranges from safe 
investments, such as an investment in government bonds,131 to 
riskier investments, such as speculation in unproven start-up 
companies.132 Regardless of the medium, both litigation 
financiers and stock traders know “any sale that results in a 
gain is a good sale.”133 Millions of stocks are purchased and sold 
daily on the floor of the NYSE when it becomes profitable for 
the investor.134 The reasoning is simple, stockholders generally 
hold little more than a pecuniary interest in the security and 
                                                     
128 Hill, supra note 68, at 504; Tidmarsh, supra note 116, at 240. 
129 Supra note 48.  
130 See generally U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/rules.shtml (last visited Sept. 12, 2017) (unlike 
litigation lending, the securities market is regulated). 
131 Parallel to TPLF arrangements.  
132 Parallel to TPALF arrangements.  
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http://www.investopedia.com/articles/stocks/10/when-to-sell-
stocks.asp.  
134 Id. (this is called “day trading”). 
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investors are not generally inclined to risk maturation when 
profit is on the line.135 There is no reason to believe that 
litigation lenders would operate with any less precision or 
commitment to the fiscal “bottom line.”  
 Second, litigation lending is eerily similar to the payday 
loan market.136 In the payday loan market, entities137 provide 
funds to relatively unsophisticated people whose personal 
circumstances are so strained that they find it attractive to 
promise not-yet-received income for a reduced cash amount to 
immediately help meet current needs.138 These loans often have 
an interest rate of 40% or more.139 Litigation lending works in 
an analogous way, targeting claimants and attorneys with little 
to no capital (or desire for risk). These individuals are enticed 
by the promise of up-front capital for a percentage of their 
potential recovery/fee. Because these litigation loans are 
nonrecourse and inherently risky, the lender can avoid usury 
laws and recover a robust fee for their investment.140   
Due to the pecuniary nature of TPALF arrangements, 
litigation lending is more likely to exacerbate the advancement 
of non-party interests, than any other form of investment in the 
U.S. While the judicial agency problem is no doubt an issue for 
                                                     
135 See generally id.  
136 Page C. Faulk, U.S. Chamber Inst. For Legal Reform, Presentation 
on Third-Party Litigation Financing (executive summary available at 
http://www.wial.com/wwcms/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/Litigation-Loans.pdf); See also Hensler, 
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(2008)). 
137 See generally, CHECK INTO CASH, Inc., https://checkintocash.com 
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138 Hensler, supra note 49, at 501.  
139 Jessica Silver-Greenberg and Peter Eavis, Service Members Left 
Vulnerable to Payday Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2013, available at 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/21/service-members-left-
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many litigants, attorneys are at the very least subject to the rules 
of professional conduct and must operate within the confines of 
their duties as a fiduciary to the claimant.141 Securities 
speculators are subject to SEC regulation and oversight.142 And, 
even payday loan lenders must operate within the confines of 
usury laws and the oversight of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau.143 TPALF operates with far less regulation 
and without many of the restrictions placed on other forms of 
investment. Its propensity to raise representational concerns is, 
at least potentially, far greater than that of the current 
representational financing model.144  
 
IV. PROPOSING PROHIBITION 
 
 Many have praised the growth of litigation lending for 
obvious, and some not-so-obvious,145 reasons. Before the 
equitable principals of TPLF can be extended to aggregate 
claims, lawmakers must address the elephant in the room—U.S. 
law and TPALF are characteristically incompatible. Though 
TPLF arrangements may require individual consent or 
unilateral disclosure to cure most compatibility quandaries, 
                                                     
141 See generally MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2016). 
142 See generally SEC, supra note 145. 
143 See generally CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov. 
144 Ralph Lindeman, Third-Party Investors Offer New Funding Source 
for Major Commercial Lawsuits, 0 BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS: DAILY 
REP. FOR EXECUTIVES 42, (Mar. 5, 2010), 
https://fulbrookmanagement.com/third-party-investors-offer-new-
funding-source-for-major-commercial-lawsuits./ (last visited Sept. 
12, 2017) (“there are no local court rules that would require the 
disclosure of the details of a financing arrangement between a 
litigant and a third party”). 
145 Aviva O. Will, Litigation Finance Can Help Break the Glass Ceiling, 
LAW360, (July 15, 2015), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/679036/opinion-litigation-
finance-can-help-break-the-glass-ceiling (an article by Burford 
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TPALF would require a substantial rewriting of many ethical, 
evidentiary, adversarial, and representational rules.  
Unlike in Canada, where lending laws require the 
disclosure of litigation financiers, theoretically curing the 
privilege and confidentiality concerns intrinsic in aggregate 
claims, U.S. law does not demand (or, in most jurisdictions, 
even contemplate) transparency in litigation lending 
arrangements.146 Distinct from jurisdictions where financing 
arrangements exist as an alternative to contingency fees, such 
as Australia, attorneys in the United States regularly rely on 
contingency fees to recover their expenses.147 Similarly, where 
other jurisdictions, such as the U.K., operate under a “user 
pays” model of fee recovery, U.S. law typically uses an 
attorney’s fee award as a punitive measure. Unlike in Canada, 
Australia, and the U.K., litigation funding is neither congruent 
with, nor necessary, to the operation of U.S. jurisprudence.  
To harmonize TPLF with the incompatible components 
of U.S. aggregate law, many practitioners and scholars have 
proposed regulatory schemes and concepts to help bridge the 
gap. Professor Jay Tidmarsh has proposed a class settlement 
auction whereby investors bid against the defendant’s highest 
settlement offer and if successful, stand in the place of the 
claimants in pursuit of their claim.148 Professor Deborah 
Hensler has argued that the concerns with TPALF are over-
exaggerations and that minor tweaks to U.S. law could account 
for the totality of those concerns.149 Tyler Hill proposed a pre-
litigation sale of claim equity to combat the agency cost of 
aggregate representation.150 While each proposal is more novel 
than the last, none account for the risks associated with the 
practice of litigation lending in the current unregulated 
provisional period. As the CEO of a major litigation lending 
                                                     
146 Kalajdzic et. al., supra note 11, at 128 (distinguishing between 
disclosure requirements in Canada and the lack of such 
requirements in the U.S.). 
147 Id. at 138-39.  
148 Tidmarsh, supra note 116.  
149 Hensler, supra note 49.  
150 Hill, supra note 68.  
RISK-FILLED RISK AVERSION 77  
 
firm recently admitted, “there are valid questions to ask about 
how [litigation lending] is used, and questions litigators need 
to ask before they engage with a financier.”151 By engaging in 
the unregulated practice of litigation lending, financiers and 
loan recipients are merely converting the risk of adverse 
judgment into the risk of ethical, evidentiary, adversarial, and 
representational violations. Until a regulatory/legal structure is 
adopted in the U.S. that accounts for the totality of the concerns 
presented by TPALF, a blanket prohibition on TPALF 
arrangements is needed to protect attorneys/claimants and 
foster a healthy environment for aggregate litigation lending to 
grow.  
A comprehensive prohibition on TPALF arrangements 
may seem extreme to proponents of litigation lending, however 
pendency prohibition makes sense. First, temporary 
prohibition assumes the eventual acceptance of TPALF. 
Proponents of TPLF believe “there is no serious debate [that] 
litigation finance is here to stay.”152 Many investment firms and 
startups have waged substantial bets on the success of litigation 
lending. By acknowledging the need for regulation, one 
ultimately recognizes that litigation lending is a legitimate tool 
of equity. Second, equity need not be sacrificed in the interim 
between non-regulation and legal recognition. Risk-averse 
attorneys and claimants may still rely on the existence TPLF in 
non-aggregate claims, institutional non-recourse lending, law 
firm lending, and other less institutionally offensive forms of 
financing. Contextually, the prohibition should only affect 
financing arrangements in aggregate claims and only for a 
controlled period. Finally, the temporary proscription of 
TPALF arrangements should motivate legislators and lobbyists 
to develop a comprehensive strategy addressing the non-
conformity of TPALF with U.S. law. By prohibiting aggregate 
claimants and their attorneys from entering into third-party 
lending arrangements until legislation catches up to the 
practice, opponents and proponents of TPALF are encouraged 
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to direct efforts toward influencing legislation where 
determinations have a broad proactive influence, as opposed to 
judiciaries where determinations are characteristically 
retroactive and narrow.  
 
V. CONCLUSION  
 
In a society that recognizes the social utility of litigation 
lending arrangements, the traditional normative concerns of 
maintenance and champerty are contemplated with less vigor. 
Where maintenance and champerty once stood, a system of 
third-party litigation lending has grown. For many, the shift 
represents a systematic balancing of the proverbial scale. For 
others, litigation lending commercializes the practice of law to 
the point of non-recognition. Regardless, extending TPLF to 
aggregate claims exacerbates many concerns presented by 
individual litigation lending and raises many new ones. This 
article set out to answer the question of whether applying TPLF 
in the aggregate context is worth the risk. It concludes that is 
not worth that risk because litigation lending exacerbates 
privilege and confidentiality issues; because of the ability of 
aggregate defendants and other improper parties to circumvent 
the adversarial nature of U.S. law by investing in their opposing 
party’s claim; and because of the representational concerns in 
advancing non-party interests to the detriment of the claimant.  
 
